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In 2001 the book Die partiell konventional, partiell empirisch bestimmte Realität
physikalischer RaumZeiten was published by Königshausen & Neumann, with
a volume of more than 400 pages. It was written by Annette Garbe.1 The
English translation might be: The Partial Conventionally, Partial Empirically
Determined Reality of Physical Space-Times.
In the introduction Garbe gives a very telling historical overview of non-
Euclidean geometry. It focuses on the impossibility proof of the parallel postulate
on the basis of the other postulates of Euclidean geometry and emphasizes the
importance of relative consistency proofs.
The following chapter of Garbe’s book deals with the problem of the foun-
dations of geometry. It begins with Karl Friedrich Gauss’ “test triangles,” i. e.
the measure of the angles of the great triangle formed by the mountain peaks in
Germany, Hohenhagen, near Göttingen, Brocken, in the Harz Mountains, and
Inselberg, in the Thüringer Wald to the south. If Gauss had been able to take
measurements of sufficient accuracy, he might have found that the sum of the
three angles of his great triangle differed from two right angles by an amount.
There is no clear documentary evidence that Gauss was actually seeking evi-
dence of non-Euclidean geometry of physical space. As Garbe points out, the
measurements of the angles of the triangle formed by the three peaks of Ho-
henhagen, Inselberg and Brocken, which Gauss made during his geodetic survey
of the Kingdom of Hannover, were not intended as an experimental test of the
Euclidean nature of the geometry of physical space. We now know that there is
an angular discrepancy due to relativistic effects, but it is far too small to be
directly observed. So, the question if it is possible to decide empirically whether
physical space is Euclidean is not simply been plucked out of the air.
1It was Annette Garbe’s „Doktorarbeit“ (in English: Ph.D.thesis). The doctoral supervisor
and first advisor was Wolfgang H. Schrader (Department of Philosophy, University of Siegen),
the second advisor was Claus Grupen (Department of Physics, University of Siegen). Professor
Schrader died in 2000, shortly after Garbe had completed her doctoral thesis and had past
the oral examination. Professor (Emeritus) Grupen told me he can still remember well that
Professor Schrader felt overburdened to write an assessment over the work due to the discussed
mathematical and physical topic that requires at least some familiarity with analysis and
differential equations. So, it was Grupen who wrote the assessment. To my question as to why
the book is not quoted, but wholly ignored by the scientific community, Grupen answered: “I
suspect that the text is just too difficult to read for philosophers.” One might add: “And too
philosophical for physicists.” I gratefully acknowledge Claus Grupen for his kindness answering
my questions.
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At this point, Garbe compares Henri Poincaré’s conventionalism with David
Hilbert’s formalism in detail, taking into account Bernhard Riemann’s, Hermann
von Helmholtz’ and Moriz Pasch’s works. The crucial point on which Garbe re-
fers to is the often discussed problem of the relation between logic, mathematics
and physics, and the problem of the possibility of deciding which axiom system
is appropriate to the representation of physical space and time.
As well known, Hans Reichenbach argued that a geometry can be true or
false only relative to the coordinative definitions which have been laid down
beforehand as conventions. That is, the statements of geometry are empiri-
cal provided that the coordinative definitions for geometry are laid down as
conventions. These coordinative definitions are to determine how geometrical
quantities, such as length, are to be measured and how geometrical relations,
like those of congruence, are to be ascertained.
Garbe picks up on this idea and generalizes it: One cannot determine the
metric structure of space-time without knowing the physical laws underlying
them. Vice versa, one cannot formulate the physical laws without knowing the
underlying space-time structure. We are facing a vicious circle.
Garbe maintains that this circle can be broken by way of conventional chosen
definitions. They act, so to say, a priori in a very flexible manner. One should
not confuse conventions with arbitrary assertions. Experience plays a crucial
role in determining and evaluating conventions. This is the basic thesis that
Garbe tries to explain and defend in her book, called “partial determination.”
It is not a coincidence that Annette Garbe borrows the term “partially de-
termined” from Ludwig Lange, who is known for the introduction of the concept
of inertial reference frames in 1885. Lange explored the question how one has to
proceed in order to avoid circular reasoning regarding to the basic concepts and
laws of physics. Generally speaking, a petitio principii occurs when one attempts
to infer a conclusion that is based upon a premise that ultimately contains the
conclusion itself, i. e. the proposition to be proved is assumed (implicitly or ex-
plicitly) in one of the premises. Or, a term is definied by using the term in the
definition.
Garbe discusses a number of examples for circular reasoning in physics which
are listed by Lange, e. g. the law of the relatively invariable inclination of all
gyroscopic rotation axes had to be stated in advance of the definition of the
fundamental system, and therefore also of the law of inertia. One could not
do other than to derive (implicitly) this theorem, now in the converse direction,
from the law of inertia. However, this would be a circular derivation, comparable
to the one in geometry, eliminated long ago, as Lange added, which contains the
unreasonable demand to define the straight line as the shortest path between
two points, and to prove afterwards that the straight line must be the shortest
path between two points. Especially, Lange criticized the “scientific dissonance”
with respect to the definition of equal time intervals. In a first step, equal time
intervals were defined by establishing that identical processes take place during
these intervals. In a second step, we observe then that identical processes take
equal time intervals.
However, as Garbe emphasizes, Lange offers a way out. Lange called it “prin-
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ciple of particular determination” (German: „Princip der Particulardetermina-
tion“). It rests on the idea that every formulation of a physical law includes a
conventional part. Thus, in the expression of the principle of inertia, we can rely
at first merely on a conceptual system of reference, to which we describe all the
determinations as required. By means of conceptual definitions we stipulate a
spatial inertial system and an inertial timescale, and take both as the basis for
all further considerations on the phenomena and their reciprocal relations.
Lange’s proposal has to bee seen in the context of the long-standing and
lively debate on absolute space, time and motion. Fitting hand in glove with
the contemporary work of others (e. g. Carl Neumann, Heinrich Streintz, James
Thomson, Ernst Mach, Ludwig Boltzmann, Heinz Kleinpeter, Paul Volkmann,
Gottlob Frege et al.) at the end of the 19th century, Lange pleaded for the
elimination of absolute concepts from physics. The original question, relative
to what frame of reference the laws of motion hold is revealed to be wrongly
posed. Physical laws essentially determine a class of reference frames, and (in
principle) a procedure for constructing them. The idea is to consider the laws as
regularities, or “rules of research” (German: “Forschungsregeln”) that systematize
and describe the space-time structure. Consequently, Euclidean geometry cannot
be taken to presuppose the laws of motion. The direction of explanation goes
the other way around. It is the principle of inertia that involves, or presupposes
only very limited spatiotemporal features, namely that motion is uniformly (with
regard to time) and rectilinearly (with regard to space).
As Garbe rightly notes, Lange did not go so far as to formulate the con-
cept of relative distant simultaneity. Only the relativity of simultaneity makes
possible the invariance of the velocity of light, or, to put it another way: the
transformations between inertial frames that preserve the velocity of light will
not preserve simultaneity.
Garbe transfers Lange’s idea of “partial determination” that still adheres to
the notion of absolute simultaneity to the interpretation of Einstein’s theory of
relativity. According to Garbe, Einstein’s theory of relativity is based on the
empirical fact of the invariance of the velocity of light and on the convention
that light signals define simultaneity. Both aspects together make Einstein’s
theory so attractive for “partial determination.”
This holds for special relativity as well as for general relativity. Special relati-
vity shares with Newtonian mechanics one crucial point: inertial coordinates are
distinguished from all others (i. e. from non-inertial reference frames), and the
laws of physics are said to hold only relative to inertial coordinate systems. It is
often argued that general relativity puts away any worries over inertial reference
frames insofar as it nullifies the privileged status of inertial reference frames. In-
ertial and uniformly accelerated motions are equivalent. However, the statement
that all reference frames, rather than just inertial frames, are equivalent is mis-
leading. Rather, the variable curvature of space-time makes the imposition of a
global inertial frame impossible. Any space-time obeying the general theory of
relativity and thus accounting for gravitation will be locally Minkowskian in the
sense that any infinitesimal region of space-time has an inertial frame obeying
the principles of special relativity.
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General relativity teaches us the lesson that the space-time distribution of
the energy-momentum tensor determines the local geometry encoded in the me-
tric tensor, and the Ricci tensor is determined by the metric tensor and its
space-time derivatives. Einstein’s field equations can be written in the form:
Rµν ≡ Rµν −
1
2
Rgµν =
8piG
c4
Tµν (1)
On the left hand side is the Einstein tensor Gµν , a specific divergence-free
combination of the Ricci curvature tensor Rµν and the metric, where R is the
scalar curvature and gµν is the metric tensor, G is Newton’s gravitational con-
stant, c is the speed of light in vacuum. On the right hand side, Tµν is the
energy-momentum tensor. By means of this equation the distribution of matter
and energy is combined with the curvature of space-time.
The crucial question is how one should interpret this connection. According
to Garbe, one should exercise caution in embracing the conclusion that the dis-
tribution of mass/energy causes space-time and that this curvature causes the
gravitational field. Einstein’s equations relate the stress energy tensor to the
metric tensor. Curvature is then determined by the metric and its derivatives.
But this does not imply a causal (and temporal) direction of determination.
Rather, gravitational potentials were coordinated to the pseudo Riemannian
space-time metric. Due to this coordination physics and geometry were connec-
ted with each other by conventional procedures. The law which connects the
metric of the Riemannian space-time with the sources of the gravitational field
(including the boundary/initial conditions) is given by the field equations. The-
se equations have been approximately confirmed by astronomical observations
concerning the paths of light rays in the gravitational field of the sun. That’s
what Garbe means when she speaks of “partial determination.”
One lesson we can learn from Garbe’s book is that conventions function
as a priori concepts in a liberal and pragmatic sense. On the one hand, they
are not immune to revision. On the other hand, we are not free to regard these
concepts as definitions or empirical concepts; instead, their constitutive status is
determined by the fact that they make certain kinds of empirical tests possible.
It is not difficult to see that Garbe’s approach comes very close to Michael
Friedman’s contemporary defense of the relativized a priori. Whereas Friedman’s
analysis of the role of conventional and constitutive principles in the theory of
relativity initiated much discussion in the literature, Garbe’s defense of “partial
determination” has been ignored by the scientific community. This is entirely
unjust due to her highly original re-discovery of Ludwig Lange.
Finally, just one last sceptical comment: Garbe combines her position with
a skeptic attitude towards causal interpretations of Einstein’s field equations.
She argues that it is misleading to claim that gravity is caused by curved space-
time. From my point of view, it is problematic to interpret the field equations of
general relativity as claiming that the stress energy tensor causes the space-time
metric, not because of the conventional infiltration, but because the relationship
between the terms on the two sides of the field equations does not represent
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an asymmetric determination we associate with causation, but an interaction
between matter and the metric field. To put is more precisely, not only are
space-time and matter in dynamical interaction, but the metric field itself is
both a source of its own curvature and of a characteristic form of radiation, i. e.
gravitational waves.
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